

In a speech to foreign journalists in Jakarta in December 1971, the Prosecutor General admitted that a survey of the attitudes of wives towards the prospects of joining their husbands in Buru, had shown that 75% were unwilling to do so, particularly because of problems with regard to their children. Despite this, the government proceeded with its plans and the first 84 families reached the island in July 1972.

That October, the senior army commander then in charge of Buru, Brigadier General Wadli Prawirasupradja, told a press conference in Jakarta that by the end of 1972, 4,500 family members would have been transported to the island, and that eventually all the prisoners' families would join their husbands or fathers, raising the total population of the camp to 50,000 (including prison officers and guards). At the same press conference, the Prosecutor General made it clear that, although the families were free citizens, they would not be allowed to leave "the project" once they had arrived on Buru. He admitted too, that enormous social problems had arisen as a result of the arrival of the families. He mentioned the following:

- education of the children: if this were left to the parents, the children might grow up "dedicated communists", he said;
- contact with the outside world: this could not be freely permitted as it could be a channel for "subversive activities";
- the families' livelihood: they could not be provided for indefinitely by the government; yet to allow them to earn a livelihood would lead to the use of money, and he was afraid that if there were "too much money" in the hands of the families it would be used for "subversive activities".

A second group of 62 families was transported to Buru in February 1974. In early 1975, more families (about 49 dependants) were sent to the island. Despite continuing government pressure to make families go to Buru, the total number on the island is less than 200, and this reflects the refusal of the prisoners and their wives to accept the government's project at face value. It is clear that wives and children transported to the island are deprived of their ordinary liberties and suffer prison restrictions in No.4 camp at Savana-Jaya. Neither wives nor children are allowed to leave the island, and they have to endure the harsh conditions imposed on the prisoners. In its issue of 21 October 1972, the Indonesian weekly *Tempo* commented:

"People can well say that, having brought the families there,

[to Buru], the problem of the political prisoners appears to have become more complicated than before."

In March 1976, the Deputy Commander of *Kopkamtib*, Admiral Sudomo, in an interview published in *Tempo*, said that the families were being sent to Buru so that the prisoners "will feel more at home". Amnesty International, however, continues to receive letters from prisoners' wives, which suggest otherwise. One wife said:

"We are being compelled to fill in forms agreeing to go there too. I filled in the form, saying 'not willing', but it seems they are going to force us to go to Buru."

RETURN TO SOCIETY

According to a December 1971 statement, by the then Deputy Prosecutor General, Sutrisno Hamidjojo, who was in charge of the Buru project, the final stage for Buru prisoners is when they are "returned to society". The phrase "returned to society" seems to imply rehabilitation or release, in other words, the end of detention. But the Indonesian authorities had a different idea in mind. At this stage, said the Deputy Prosecutor General:

"Political prisoners would remain on the island but would no longer be bound by discipline, such as, having to attend roll-call."

As with prisoners elsewhere in the Republic, the authorities have stated that political prisoners would be considered rehabilitated when they had changed their ideology from communism to *Panca Sila*. The authorities, however, do not specify by exactly what criteria their prisoners' ideological tendencies could be verified, especially when they consider the latter "dedicated communists" and "traitors". Up till the present, the government has clearly not taken the trouble to spell out a release programme whereby the prisoners could spend the rest of their lives as free citizens of the Republic. This applies on Buru to both old and young men (some of whom were under 15 when arrested). A case in point is the boy who was transported to the island with his only parent, his father, who was a political prisoner. The father died in captivity but his son is still on the island. The future is bleak also for those wives and children on the island who are now the permanent inhabitants of a prisoner colony.

The wife of a prisoner on Buru wrote recently to Amnesty International:

"Now he is still there, far from his wife and family. Where is the humanity of our country?"

The London *Daily Telegraph* interviewed a prisoner on Buru in March 1972. The reporter asked the prisoner: "Are you happy in Buru?" He replied: "Of course, no, no." The reporter continued: "The Government says that you are happy." The prisoner replied: "Of course, yes, yes. What else will they say?"

GOVERNMENT POLICY

The Indonesian Government speaks of prisoners being "transmigrated to the island of Buru and other islands, in accordance with the guidelines on national transmigration as set forth in the Second Five-Year National Development Plan". The impression given is that the prisoners are being treated in the same way as ordinary Indonesian citizens who voluntarily transmigrate to other islands. Clearly the Buru project is completely different from what the Government means by national "transmigration" in relation to free citizens of the Republic.

The main characteristics of the Buru project are quite clear. First, those affected were long-standing political prisoners held without trial when they were transported to Buru, and they have remained prisoners there. The Government has cajoled and threatened families to join the prisoners in prison camps on the island, but the majority of the families have resisted attempts to transport them to the island. Not a single prisoner has ever been "released" on the island, and not a single prisoner or member of his family who has joined him on the island, has been allowed to leave Buru. The Buru project, simply, means the transportation of political prisoners to a permanent penal colony.

Moreover, the prisoners are systematically used as forced labour, are made to supply all the food and necessities for their very survival, and are compelled even to provide the food consumed by the Army officials guarding them.

Transportation to a penal settlement, forced labour and exploitation, a desperate daily struggle for survival, permanent detention, these are the fundamentals of the Buru project.

Amnesty International has consistently opposed the Indonesian Government's Buru project. The Buru "solution" is a totally deplorable model for the Indonesian Government to use when formulating plans to "transmigrate" other untried political prisoners to Buru and other islands. When the Indonesian Government talks about "releases", they should mean the proper and unconditional release of prisoners, and not the "transmigration solution".

The prisoners' predicament was clearly conveyed by the Indonesian journalist, Marcel Beding, in the Indonesian newspaper,

Kompas, after his visit to Buru in December 1971:

"How long have they to stay there [in Buru]? They themselves are asking this question. Their families are asking this question and I myself join in asking it. And the answer is as dark as the sky above Unit 2 on that December afternoon in 1971. . . . They are all lonely men. They are all lonely while labouring from morning to sunset. They are also troubled by the feeling of uncertainty about the future and about their loved ones far across the sea, parents, wives, children, relatives."

WOMEN AND IMPRISONMENT

President Suharto's "New Order" banned *Gerwani* (*Gerakan Wanita Indonesia*: Indonesian Women's Movement) and a large number of mass organizations for alleged complicity in the abortive coup.

Gerwani was by that time the largest women's organization in Indonesia, with a membership of more than one million. It was not officially affiliated to the Communist Party, but described itself as "an organization of communist and non-communist women". It was part of the left-wing movement quashed by the military as soon as the attempted coup had been foiled. Compared with other organizations, *Gerwani* was singled out for attack in the anti-left campaign. Sensational allegations were made about it which played a large part in provoking massacres that occurred in many parts of the country during the last three months of 1965 and in 1966. To explain this, also to explain the circumstances of the arrest of a number of women still in detention, it is necessary to refer briefly to the events of 1 October 1965.

The coup conspirators established their headquarters at a para-military training camp in Lubang Buaya, located on an Air Force base on the outskirts of Jakarta. This training camp had been used for several months to train volunteers for "Confrontation" with Malaysia. Political parties and organizations supporting President Sukarno and his confrontation policy responded to a call for volunteers by setting up their own training camps. The camp at Lubang Buaya was being used by several nationalist and left-wing organizations. A number of women and girls had attended courses there from the middle of 1965 till the day of the attempted coup. In addition to those attending para-military courses, there were women helping with health services and performing kitchen and dormitory duties.

During the coup attempt by middle-ranking Army officers, six generals were kidnapped and killed, and their bodies were found in a disused well at Lubang Buaya. After the bodies were discovered, sensational reports appeared in the press alleging that their sex organs had been mutilated and eyes gouged out. It was further alleged that these atrocities had been committed by the women at the camp. The women were said to have engaged in obscene dancing and to have prostituted themselves in a grotesque manner.

President Sukarno, still formally Head of State but rapidly losing political control, ordered a post mortem examination of the bodies and this revealed that there had been no mutilation. Eyes were damaged because the bodies had been immersed in water. The stories persisted however, and newspapers published reports of confessions made by young girls during interrogation by military officers.

Underlying these sensational reports, which had a traumatic effect on Indonesian society, was a story of torture and sexual abuse of these girls under interrogation, many of whom were politically naive and terrified into making confessions by the torture and abuse to which they were subjected.

Gerwani was accused by the authorities of having mobilised these girls and of being responsible for the alleged atrocities. Yet despite the shrillness of these accusations, it is a fact that even now, more than 11 years after the event, no one alleged to have been directly involved in the Lubang Buaya events has been tried. So far only a handful of women have been brought to trial, and the charges against them were not directly related to the alleged atrocities in Lubang Buaya. Approximately 800 trials have so far taken place, many of them related to actual occurrences in Lubang Buaya, but the alleged atrocities have never been confirmed by the testimony of witnesses who appeared at these trials. Hundreds of women and girls said to have been responsible for or indirectly involved in the events, are still held in prison, without charge or trial.

The first major trial of women prisoners began nine years after the 1965 events, in February 1975 (see Chapter 6).

WOMEN PRISONERS

It is not possible to establish precisely how many women are still being held without trial. The largest women's prison is at Plantungan in Central Java where there are about 300 inmates. About 50 women are detained in Bukit Duri prison in Jakarta and about 60 in the women's prison in Bulu near Semarang. There are women's prisons throughout the archipelago. Probably about 2,000 women are being held without trial.

Gerwani leaders and members probably comprise a fairly large proportion of the women prisoners. Many members of the organization's central board are known to be in detention as well as local members. *Gerwani* members were persecuted during the first few days after the abortive coup. Many hid, often by moving to other areas. Reports of the "discovery" of such "fugitives from justice" still appear in the Indonesian press. There must be many thousands of women in Indonesia who, lest they get arrested, are still striving

to conceal their past legitimate membership of previously public, and respectable organizations.

A Typical Case: Mrs Sundari

Mrs Sundari was active in her local branch of *Gerwani* in Jakarta at the time of the abortive coup. Her husband was also a member of a left-wing organization. Their home was a center of political activity and various political groups held meetings there. Shortly after the coup attempt, an Army team raided their house. They claimed that a meeting had taken place there shortly before the coup and that political plans had been made at that meeting. The Sundaris were probably suspected of discussing possible political developments in the event of a left-wing takeover. Such a suspicion would have been enough to get them arrested on accusations of direct involvement in the attempted coup. Both Mrs Sundari and her husband were arrested in October 1965. She has been in Bukit Duri Prison ever since and she is one of the 14,000 prisoners on Buru Island.

WOMEN AT LUBANG BUAYA

Women who were at Lubang Buaya or who were alleged to have been there also comprise a considerable proportion of the prisoners. Many of them were girls in their early teens when arrested in 1965. A number of them are illiterate.

A Typical Case: Walmijati

At the time of the attempted coup, Walmijati was an auxiliary in the Friendship Hospital, Jakarta. She was about 15 at the time. While working in Jakarta, she attended training courses at the Lubang Buaya camp. It is not known exactly what her political affiliations were, but she probably belonged to one of the youth movements that went to Lubang Buaya for training.

During interrogations, Walmijati was severely beaten and injured. She denied accusations that she had participated in the alleged sexual atrocities at Lubang Buaya. After the beatings by the interrogators, she became emotionally disturbed. She was arrested in October 1965 and detained in Bukit Duri Prison. She has been there ever since and has not been tried. Her family is poor and cannot afford to visit her in prison.

TRADE UNIONISTS

There are also activists among the prisoners. Women workers had for many years played a prominent part in the trade union movement.

The left-wing trade union federation, SOBSI, had an active Women's Department, many of whose members are now in prison.

A Typical Case: Mrs Pudjiati

Mrs Pudjiati is about 50. She was born in Central Java and since her youth has been involved in left-wing movements in Indonesia. During the Japanese occupation and the war of liberation against the Dutch, she was a member of *Pesindo*, the Indonesian Socialist Youth, which later became *Pemuda Rakjat*, the People's Youth Movement. She worked for many years at the Unilever factory in Jakarta and while there, became involved in trade union activity. She was a well-known activist in SB Unilever (the trade union in the factory) and was several times arrested during demonstrations against rising prices and while on deputations calling for higher wages. These arrests took place while President Sukarno was in power. Pudjiati was also a member of the Jakarta Council of SOBSI, to which SB Unilever was affiliated.

After the abortive coup, many trade unionists were dismissed from their jobs. *SOBSI* and its affiliated trade unions were banned and many union members arrested. Their arrest and detention was because they belong to left-wing organizations and not because they were in any way involved personally in the coup. Pudjiati probably was arrested in 1966. She was detained in Bukit Duri Prison then transferred to Plantungan in 1971. She was transferred again in 1976 to Bulu Prison.

OTHER CASES OF WOMEN IN PRISON

Many of the women in prison were, however, simply victims of circumstance, people picked up on the streets unable to identify themselves or defend themselves against political charges; women whose sons and daughters were being sought by the Army; women who were picked up together with their husbands or brothers simply because they were relatives.

Two Typical Cases: Miss Tumirah

Miss Tumirah is in her mid-30s. She is not an educated woman and is uninterested in politics. At the time of the coup, she was doing domestic work or selling in markets. She was apparently picked up by the military simply because she failed to produce an identity card. Her case exemplifies the indiscriminate way in which arrests were made and the extremely inadequate arrangements for the quick release of people against whom no charge could possibly be made. She was arrested in the late 1960s and detained in Bukit Duri Prison. She has now been released.

She was arrested, together with a friend, in 1969 when they went to the Army security authorities to make inquiries about their husbands who had been arrested. They were taken by the authorities to Bukit Duri Prison, where they have been kept ever since. Suhasih's husband is said to have given asylum to someone the authorities were looking for in connection with the attempted coup. He was arrested and tried on these charges and is now serving a 12 year sentence. Suhasih was presumably arrested because it was thought that she knew that her husband had given asylum to this man and that she had not reported him to the authorities for doing so.

GENERAL CONDITIONS

Some Indonesian prisons are exclusively for women, for instance, Bukit Duri (see also chapter 7). In some, women are used as forced labour, for instance, Plantungan. There are local prisons where young children live with their mothers, for instance, Lampung. In addition, there are the women (and their children) who have gone to Buru to join their husbands, who now have to stay in special camps and may not leave Buru.

In general, women prisoners' conditions are much the same as men's, although where they are allowed to sell handicrafts and receive the returns for their work, their position is somewhat alleviated.

A number of the women prisoners have husbands who are also in detention. The major concern of a prisoner is the fate of his or her family and this concern is inevitably greater when both parents are in prison. Many women prisoners suffer the hardship of separation from their children. In many cases women have lost all contact with both husbands and children. No prisoners are permitted to initiate contact with their families; contact is made only if the family outside takes the initiative, and when both parents are in prison this is much less likely to happen.

Some women have the comfort of knowing their children are being cared for by relatives or neighbours, but this is not always the case. Even close relatives have been reluctant to look after the children of political prisoners because of the risks involved, social stigma and harassment.

TORTURE

Many women now in detention are known to have suffered severe torture during their interrogations by military intelligence officers.

The tortures inflicted have included beatings, attacks with knives or daggers, burning with cigarettes, sexual assault and electric shocks. The young girls arrested in connection with the events in Lubang Buaya were badly tortured and some of them have been permanently affected.

A torture case

The London *Sunday Times*, 11 January 1976, published an interview with a girl who had been a member of a left-wing organization before the coup and who was arrested in 1968. She was taken to the local military post and witnessed the torture of other women. She was herself severely tortured. She was stripped naked and then beaten with a stick by the intelligence officer. Her hair was burnt. Then she was placed on a table. A stick was inserted into her vagina and her pubic hair was burnt.

PRISONERS' FAMILIES

The wives and children of political detainees face enormous difficulties in a society that has become terrified of being suspected of personal acquaintance with political prisoners who have been so severely condemned by the Indonesian authorities. In normal circumstances, the strong sense of family responsibility overrides this; but political prisoners are beyond the pale, having for years been officially condemned.

"Certificates of Non-involvement" in the October 1965 events have, for many years, been the prerequisite for entering schools, obtaining employment and moving from one district to another. Even today, although the authorities have announced that such certificates are no longer required, the situation remains basically the same in most localities where central government policy is subject to the discretion of local military commanders and officials. Foreign firms are known to have to ask for such certificates when interviewing potential employees.

Few Indonesian women have regular employment or special occupational skills. Many prisoners' wives have tried to survive by selling cakes, dressmaking and setting up stalls, or have become domestic servants. But none of these forms of livelihood are very remunerative and the families have remained in a state of penury. Those who know where their husbands are detained take food to the prison, as they know what the conditions inside are like; this adds to their considerable financial burden. Another major expense is school fees and other educational expenses for their children. The state does not provide free primary or secondary education.

On top of having to cope with financial hardship, the prisoners' wives face suspicion and sometimes open hostility from their local communities. This has been largely due to government persecution of the prisoners and their families. The complex of difficulties experienced by prisoners' wives has had such severe effect that many have had to conceal their marriages or divorce their husbands.

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THE MALARI AFFAIR

President Suharto's Government has detained people in connection with events other than those of 1965. The way these other prisoners have been treated shows that government policy and practice have been equally repressive as regards prisoners whom the authorities could not, and did not, claim to be communist.

Extensive rioting broke out in Jakarta on 15 January 1974, in the course of which 13 people were killed and 770 arrested. The Indonesian Government claimed that the *Malari* (15 January) Affair was a conspiracy to overthrow the Government, organized by two political parties which had been banned by the former President Sukarno in 1960, the *Parti Sosialis Indonesia* (PSI: Indonesian Socialist Party) and *Masjumi* (the leading Islamic party). President Suharto removed from key positions the three most important military figures in the country—Lieutenant General Ali Murtopo, General Sumitro and Lieutenant General Sutopo Juwono—implying that there was a power struggle within the military. It was following the dismissal of General Sumitro that President Suharto resumed the position of chief of *Kopkamtib*. General Sumitro was also relieved of his post of deputy commander of the Armed Forces.

The *Malari* incidents began with student demonstrations against the visit to Jakarta of the then Japanese Prime Minister. Subsequently there were extensive riots involving large numbers of people, which seemed to have been a reflection of widespread discontent with Government economic policy.

Most the 770 people arrested were accused of vandalism and looting. Five months after the *Malari* Affair, about 50 people remained in prison in Jakarta and another 32 in Surabaya. They were alleged to have instigated the riot. This alleged "hard core" of the *Malari* prisoners included distinguished former politicians, such as Mr Soebadio Sastrosatomo, leader of the PSI before it was banned in 1960; former chief advisers to President Suharto's Government, such as Professor Sarbini Sumowinata; important university lecturers, such as Dr Dorodjatan Kuntjorojakti; prominent human rights figures and lawyers, such as Mr Adnan Buyung Nasution and Mr Yap Thiam Hien; and university student leaders. The cases of all of them were taken up by Amnesty International.

Eleven months after his arrest, the student leader, Hariman

Siregar, was the first *Malari* defendant to be brought to trial. Subsequently, two other student leaders, Sjahrir and Aini Chalid, were also tried. The prosecution sought to establish that they were the ring-leaders of the *Malari* Affair, but none of the evidence produced in court proved that any of the student leaders were personally responsible for the *Malari* riots. Instead, it was clear that the three student leaders were responsible for criticizing the government's development policies, during the period immediately preceding the *Malari* Affair. The ultimate responsibility for the *Malari* riots, according to the three defendants, lay elsewhere. The question of who was responsible was not resolved at the trials, and there is still speculation in Jakarta about the extent to which the *Malari* Affair was an open manifestation of a power struggle within the military.

Eventually, in May 1976, more than two years after the *Malari* Affair, all the prisoners, except the three who had been tried, were released without trial. When the Prosecutor General, General Ali Said, told journalists that on 10 May 1976, that they had been released, he added that the state intelligence agency was continuing its investigation of those responsible for the *Malari* riots. "So far we have not found who they are, but the investigation is going on", he said. (*Indonesia Times*, 11 May 1976)

This statement prompted an instant response from Mr Adnan Buyung Nasution, Director of the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute, who had himself been a *Malari* prisoner held without trial. He pointed out:

"The Prosecutor General's statement means that it is certain the champions and mastermind of *Malari* are not those people who were detained, because they were suspected of being the mastermind or ring-leaders of that incident, including myself and my friends. . .". (*Sinar Harapan*, 11 May 1976).

Of the three *Malari* prisoners who had been tried and who remained in prison, one was released in August and another in October 1976. Sjahrir, a former student leader at the University of Indonesia in Jakarta, is the last remaining *Malari* prisoner, serving a 6½ years' sentence.

These cases of imprisonment on charges of subversion illustrate the way in which the Indonesian authorities use the Subversion Act against political prisoners who were not held in connection with the 1965 attempted coup. Although detention without trial under the Subversion Act is limited to one year, nevertheless all the *Malari* prisoners held for more than a year were simply charged again under its provisions. This extended beyond one year their period of deten-

tion without trial. Moreover, it is now abundantly clear that the authorities had no case against people such as Buyung Nasution, who was detained for 22 months without trial, nor against other *Malari* prisoners who were held for up to almost two and a half years without trial. The trials of the student leaders were political show trials intended to camouflage the Government's embarrassment over widespread criticism of failures in its development programmes and the unrest in Jakarta which led to the riots.

The Government's handling of the *Malari* Affair illustrates its arbitrary way of treating those it considers its political opponents and those who criticise its policies. Immediately after the *Malari* Affair, the Government banned 11 newspapers and journals, including the country's oldest and most respected newspapers, *Indonesian Raya*, *Pedoman*, *Abadi*, *Harian Kami*. The authorities would not let former editorial staff members of these papers work on other publications. Thus Rosihan Anwar, a president of the Indonesian Journalist's Association, has not been allowed to work as a journalist since the closure of *Pedoman*, the paper he edited. The distinguished Indonesian journalist Mochtar Lubis was arrested, the official explanation for this being that the purpose of the arrest was "to find out his possible involvement" in the *Malari* Affair.

Significantly, among the people arrested were those who had strongly criticized the former regime of President Sukarno and who had been victimized by that government. They included Adnan Buyung Nasution, Professor Sarbini, and Mochtar Lubis. Mochtar Lubis was imprisoned for more than nine years by the Sukarno regime because of his exposure of political and administrative malpractices, and he was one of the Indonesian prisoners of conscience adopted by Amnesty International before 1965.

As well as imprisoning people without trial, the government also revealed how it dealt with those it regarded as dissidents. For example, Dr Deliar Noer, who received his doctorate at Cornell University in the United States, was, in 1966, a member of President Suharto's personal political advisory staff. At the time of the *Malari* Affair, he was president of the Jakarta Teachers' College, and was believed by the Government to have harboured "independent ideas". As a result he was barred from "teaching at any university"—state or private.

Then there is the case of Dr Soedjatmoko, former Indonesian ambassador to the United States. Although at the time of the *Malari* Affair he was special adviser to the Indonesian Planning Agency, *Bappenas*, Dr Soedjatmoko was banned from travelling outside the country, despite his long-standing links with organizations such as

the Ford Foundation. The Indonesian security authorities suspected that Dr Soedjatmoko was one of the "brains" behind the *Malari* Affair, and he was subjected to intensive interrogation for three weeks.

None of the *Malari* prisoners were said by the government to have been communists, nor were they said to have been influenced by communists. Nonetheless, they remained in prison, in some cases for almost two and a half years without trial, and their detention would have lasted much longer had the Indonesian Government not been subjected to very strong international criticism. The Government asserted, when the *Malari* arrests took place, that the detainees were personally involved in the *Malari* Affair. This, the Indonesian Government has signally failed to prove. Similarly, as regards those political prisoners who were arrested and imprisoned for alleged "personal involvement" in the 1965 attempted coup, the Indonesian Government has not proved that those held without trial were personally responsible.

GOVERNMENT: SOCIAL POLICY AND IMPRISONMENT

President Suharto's "New Order" has conducted an inquisition among Indonesians suspected of left-wing tendencies. The effects of the inquisition are widespread. First, there are the more than 5,000 prisoners, perhaps as many as 100,000 who are still held in grim conditions without trial. The damage done to the prisoners' families has been appalling. They have been victimized and denied employment. Moreover, the Indonesian Government has systematically denied employment in government and state departments to people suspected of leftist tendencies. Released prisoners are similarly denied access to government jobs; moreover, private firms in Indonesia are discouraged by the military authorities from employing released prisoners. The same applies to those not issued with a "Certificate of Non-involvement" which all Indonesians must possess in order to prove they were never subjected to the inquisition.

All this clearly shows why the situation of political prisoners is especially desperate. All "released" prisoners have to spend a year or more under "town arrest", which means that they must report regularly to specified military offices, and must apply for permission to leave a specified town; such permission is almost invariably refused. Moreover, a prisoner has to have a known, fixed address; this is a pre-condition of release, and it poses an insuperable problem for many prisoners whose family lives have been destroyed as a consequence of their more than 11 years' imprisonment, or because they find it difficult to trace their families. Many released prisoners, as well as being put under "town arrest" are also subjected to "house arrest", which means that they cannot leave their homes for several months and often for up to a year.

Because of these aspects of government policy, released prisoners are in an especially vulnerable position. Their families have been deprived of their financial support during their years of captivity. Following release, the prisoners are denied employment and this imposes an additional strain on the families' limited resources. Released prisoners retain the category to which the authorities have assigned them, and are thus labelled by the Government as constant suspects, even though released.

It is not surprising therefore that the friends, former acquaint-

tances and neighbours of released prisoners are apprehensive about them and regard associating with them as dangerous and likely to attract the attention of *Kopkamtib*. For most ordinary Indonesians, a released prisoner is, in this sense, a dangerous person to know. And it is largely government policy as regards prisoners and their release which is the basis for this fear. A few exceptional Indonesians are prepared to express their opinions about the treatment of political prisoners.

The distinguished Indonesian lawyers, Mr Yap Thiam Hien and Mr Adnan Buyung Nasution, both of whom have been political prisoners themselves, have spoken out against the continued imprisonment and treatment of the prisoners held in connection with the 1965 events. In many cases, leading Indonesians would have expressed their views had they known about the true circumstances affecting political prisoners. There is widespread ignorance about the problem in Indonesia, despite the scale and depth of its effect on society. The ignorance stems partly from the very real possibility that meddling in questions concerning political prisoners is dangerous and may lead to arrest and interrogation. And it is partly due to the misleading and false propaganda disseminated by the government through the Indonesian press, radio and television.

The Government has in the past defined its attitude towards political prisoners in different ways to different audiences. At home, the Government has emphasized that the release of political prisoners was dangerous because they constituted a threat to the security of the state. Abroad, the Government has stressed the security argument and also the argument that released political prisoners would face reprisals from members of the community. Well-informed observers of Indonesia agree that these two arguments have no bearing on the question of releasing untried political prisoners; President Suharto's "New Order" has not been endangered by a serious threat of communist subversion. Moreover, the Government has not produced a single example of wide-scale reprisals against political prisoners from members of their community following their release. According to the Government's own claims, more than half a million political prisoners have been released over the last 11 years, yet it has not supplied evidence to substantiate its two lines of argument.

These questions were raised on 18 November 1976, when an Indonesian delegation visiting London requested an interview with Martin Ennals, the Secretary General of Amnesty International. The leader of the delegation, General Ali Murtopo, formerly personal adviser to President Suharto and who holds a key position in state intelligence, was asked by Martin Ennals whether in the Govern-

ment's view, communist subversion was seen as a major threat, and whether there had been any wide-scale reprisals in the community against released political prisoners. General Ali Murtopo's reply was that communist subversion was not a serious threat to the Indonesian Government and that there had not been wide-scale reprisals against political prisoners.

Most recently, the Indonesian Government has abandoned its long-maintained arguments against the release of political prisoners. It now explains that further delays in the release of political prisoners are due to unemployment in Indonesia.

THE DECEMBER 1976 ANNOUNCEMENT

On 1 December 1976, the Indonesian Government announced a program for the release and/or transmigration of political prisoners. The International Commission of Jurists in Geneva, has described the prelude to this government announcement:

"During 1976, there has been intensive pressure in the US Congress and elsewhere about political detainees in Indonesia. With a view to safeguarding their foreign aid program, the Indonesian authorities have suggested that large scale releases are under way. In an interview published in the Netherlands in *De Telegraaf* on 11 June 1976, the head of the national security organisation, Admiral Sudomo, announced a plan to release the admitted 36,000 political prisoners in Indonesia, including all those on the notorious island of Buru, by the end of 1977.

"This program was received abroad with some scepticism, especially when the Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, in a statement to a US Congressional Sub-Committee made three weeks later on 30 June, contradicted Admiral Sudomo and said that the 10,000 prisoners on Buru Island would not be released but would be 'settled' there permanently. Moreover, on 24 July Admiral Sudomo stated that only 2,500 of the 34,000 category B prisoners (i.e. those against whom there is admittedly insufficient evidence to bring them to trial) would be released by the end of 1976. Finally, on 27 August 1976, Admiral Sudomo made a further announcement evading the whole issue by stating that increasing communist activities, not in Indonesia but in Malaysia and Singapore, would affect the planned release of prisoners. He said the two things which had to be taken into account were the 'possible infiltration' of communist elements from outside and the 'possible smuggling of weapons into Indonesia' to arm communist remnants there. It is shocking that tens of thousands of

persons, large numbers of them having no connection with the communist party, should be kept detained without trial upon such hypothetical grounds more than 10 years after an abortive coup in which they have never been shown to have participated.” (*ICJ Review* No.17, December 1976).

On 1 December 1976, the chief of staff of *Kopkamtib*, Admiral Sudomo, presided over a ceremony in Jakarta at which 2,500 category B prisoners were announced released that very day. The Government said this was the second group of category B prisoners to have been released, the first having been on 1 December 1975, totalling 1,309 persons.

Admiral Sudomo announced that: “The Government has drawn up a scheme for another phased release of the category B detainees as follows:

1977 – 10,000 persons
1978 – 10,000 persons
1979 – the rest.”

To justify further delaying the release of category B prisoners, Admiral Sudomo said that an unspecified number of the prisoners would be “transmigrated”, that is, transported to permanent penal settlements. Because “resettlement and transmigration require a large budget which could not be met in one fiscal year; hence the release by stages in 1977, 1978 and 1979”.

Thus, the Indonesian Government announced a three-year plan which was apparently a scheme to release untried political prisoners, but actually meant that large numbers would be transported to permanent penal settlements, as prisoners (see Appendix II). The government’s justification for transporting these prisoners to permanent penal settlements was that there were insufficient employment opportunities for the prisoners following their release, “since unemployment would create fertile ground for all kinds of acts contrary to law, and this in itself would pose a threat to the national security, particularly to law and order” (see also chapter 9).

Amnesty International finds the government’s plans to “transmigrate” political prisoners to permanent penal settlements totally unacceptable. Amnesty International holds the view that all political prisoners held without trial in Indonesia, including all those already “transmigrated”, should be released and should be free to return to their homes. The Indonesian Government’s problem of national unemployment is not the fault of the prisoners. Political prisoners should be judged only according to the rule of law, and delay in releasing those held without trial cannot be justified by the kinds

of argument offered by the Indonesian Government.

In announcing the government’s December 1976 program, Admiral Sudomo said:

“As for category A detainees, most of them have been sentenced, and the remainder will certainly be tried in our court of justice”.

In this way, Admiral Sudomo has qualified a previous statement made in an interview published in the Dutch newspaper, *De Telegraaf*, on 11 June 1976. On that occasion he said that all remaining category A detainees would be tried before the end of 1979. Considering the rate at which the government has brought prisoners to trial, and the fact that the trials so far held have invariably involved a clear miscarriage of justice, there are no grounds for believing that “the remainder will certainly be tried in our court of justice” before the end of 1979. Moreover, Admiral Sudomo is mistaken in saying of the category A prisoners that “most of them have been sentenced”. According to the government there are still about 1,700 category A prisoners in detention, which is much more than the 800 cases the government claims have been tried.

Admiral Sudomo also said, “As we know, detainees in category C have all been released a long time ago”. As explained in Chapter 4 and contrary to what Admiral Sudomo says, local military commanders are this day announcing releases of category C prisoners and there are still category C prisoners in detention.

The Indonesian Government talks of “releases”, yet declares at the same time that many prisoners will be transported to permanent penal colonies. The Government speaks of releases of all category B prisoners in a phased program over three years, recalling at the same time that, “detainees belonging to category C have all been released a long time ago”. Yet, it is now known that a series of Indonesian Government assurances about alleged releases, including those given personally and repeatedly by President Suharto, were untrue and misleading.

It is Amnesty International’s view that all the untried political prisoners in Indonesia should be released unconditionally and without further delay.

* * *

The question asked by the Indonesian journalist, Marcel Beding, in *Kompas* after his visit to Buru in December 1971 is pertinent:

“How long have they to stay there? They themselves are asking this question. Their families are asking this question and I myself join in asking it.”

APPENDIX I

THE DECISION OF THE COMMANDER OF THE *Kopkamtib*
No.KEP-028/KOPKAM/10/68 (ISSUED AND OPERATIVE
FROM 18th OCTOBER 1968) AS AMENDED BY THE
DECISION OF THE COMMANDER OF THE *Kopkamtib*
No.KEP-010/KOPKAM/3/1969 (ISSUED ON 3rd MARCH
1969 TO OPERATE RETROACTIVELY FOR THE PERIOD
SINCE 18th OCTOBER 1968)

The Commander of the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order. . .

Herewith Decides

To improve the policy of screening of civil military personnel in Government service in the following ways:

CHAPTER 1

Article 1

This decision is an improved guide to activities concerned with purging of the civil and military personnel of Government Departments, Bodies and Institutions of persons and elements belonging to the treasonable G-30-S/PKI movement, including previous and subsequent activities covert and overt, so that the optimum results are achieved, with a balanced matching of efforts and goals.

Article 2

The principles of policy contained in this decision shall provide guidelines for acting according to the same norms in all matters of similar character in so far as this is possible. . .

CHAPTER 2

Article 4

Those involved in the treasonable G-30-S/PKI movement are classified as follows:

A. Those who were clearly *involved directly*, that is

1. those who planned, took part in planning or helped in the planning of the treasonable movement, or had foreknowledge of its planning and failed to report it to the authorities;

2. those who, conscious of the aims of the movement, engaged in the execution of activities within the framework of that movement, i.e.
 - (a) Principal Protagonists, that is persons who co-ordinated the operation and other activities;
 - (b) Protagonists, that is persons who implemented the actual operation or the activities mentioned in 2(a);
 - (c) Participants, that is persons who took part in implementing the operation and activities mentioned in 2(a).

B. Persons clearly *involved indirectly*, are

1. those who, knowing of the treasonable movement, and/or its subsequent activities, have assumed an attitude, whether by deed or word demonstrated support for this movement or opposed or hindered efforts to suppress it;
2. committee members, leaders and members of the banned PKI and/or those who had taken an oath or made promises before the PKI or before committee members or leaders of mass organizations based on the same principles as this party or operating under its aegis, together with all their activists.

C. Persons of whom indications exist or who may reasonably be assumed to have been directly or indirectly involved, are:

1. those who according to the existing antecedents were involved in the *Madiun* Affair* and after the September 1965 attempted coup did not clearly oppose it in any way open to them, bearing in mind their respective situations and abilities, or whose actions have always tended to support the PKI;
2. those who were members of mass organizations based on the same principles as the banned PKI or operating under its aegis;
3. those who have shown sympathy for the PKI in their attitudes and actions.

Article 5

1. Measures taken against personnel involved may be classified thus:

- Repressive actions, comprising:
 - a) prosecution under criminal law;
 - b) administrative prosecution, i.e.
 - (1) dishonourable dismissal;

* Ed - A major clash between the PKI and the Army in September 1948.

(2) restriction of opportunities in relation to certain offices and positions, due regard being paid to all regulations existing in this respect;

— Preventive actions, comprising:

- 1) indoctrination;
- 2) observation of mentality.

Article 6

The application of the several kinds of prosecutive measures shall be as follows:

1. Those classified under Article 4, letter A, shall be prosecuted under criminal law and subjected to administrative action in the form of dishonourable dismissal. While action against them is in progress they shall be kept in custody. Alternatively the Commander of the *Kopkamtib* or the Deputy Commander of the *Kopkamtib* may assign them in the interests of public order to reside in a particular place.
2. Those classified under Article 4, letter B, shall be subjected to administrative measures in the form of dishonourable dismissal. The Commander of the *Kopkamtib* or Deputy Commander of the *Kopkamtib* may assign them in the interests of security to reside in a particular place.
3. Those classified under Article 4, letter C, shall be subject to the following measures:
 - a) those classified under Article 4, letter C1, shall be dismissed and placed under the supervision of the appropriate Government agencies;
 - b) those classified under Article 4, letter C2, shall be subjected to restrictions in relation to particular offices and positions and shall undergo indoctrination;
 - c) those classified under Article 4, letter C3, shall be placed under supervision and shall undergo indoctrination.

APPENDIX II

Embassy of the
Republic of Indonesia
Information Department

38 Grosvenor Square
London, W1
Telephone: 01-499 7661

PRESS RELEASE

No. 015/Pen/76

PRESS-STATEMENT
OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE COMMAND FOR THE RESTORATION
OF ORDER AND SECURITY
(*Kopkamtib*)
ON DECEMBER 1, 1976

1. Today, on the 1st of December 1976, a total of 2,500 detainees involved in the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party)—September 30th Movement held at various rehabilitation institutions in Indonesia have been released, and returned to society. They were all of the "B" category detainees.

This is the second group that has been released of the above mentioned category; the first being on December 1, 1975, totalling 1,309 persons.

Those released recently consist of the following:

- a) 1,430 persons from Sumatra
- b) 863 persons from Java
- c) 83 persons from Kalimantan
- d) 80 persons from Sulawesi
- e) 44 persons from Maluku.

2. In his annual state address to the Indonesian House of Representatives on August 16, 1976, President Soeharto stated that due to growing political stability coupled with the increasing stability of our national resilience, parallel to economic development the results of which are increasingly enjoyed by the people, we can now immediately solve as a whole, one of our national problems, namely that of detainees.

As we know, detainees belonging to "C" category have all been released a long time ago. Those of the "B" category, who are difficult or impossible to be brought to trial due to insufficient evidence, will have their cases speeded up hopefully after the general election next year.

Nevertheless, although their misdeeds have almost brought about the destruction of our Nation and Country, they still belong to the big family of the Indonesian Nation founded on Pancha Sila.

We must accept them back in our community. We must make them realise about their past errors, we must urge them to participate in restoring their individual life and in jointly building up the community.

In accordance with the above policy statement, the Government has drawn a scheme for another phased release of the "B" category detainees as follows:

- 1977 – 10,000 persons
- 1978 – 10,000 persons
- 1979 – the rest.

As for the "A" category detainees, most of them have been sentenced and the remaining will certainly be tried in our court of justice.

The main problems to be solved immediately are about the "B" category detainees:

1) There must be sufficient employment opportunities for them, since unemployment would create fertile ground for all kinds of acts contrary to law, and this in itself would pose a threat to the national security, particularly to law and order.

For this reason, the Government plans to establish transmigration centres in Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and other places. For those who come from Java which is densely populated will be transmigrated to the island of Buru and other islands, in accordance with the guidelines on national transmigration as stated in the Second Five-Year National Development Program.

The Program states that the resettlement and transmigration require a large budget and this could not be met in one fiscal year; hence the release by phases in 1977, 1978 and 1979.

2) Those released and returned to the society will have to show concrete deeds as law abiding citizens. Their freedom as citizens is guaranteed as long as they think and act as good citizens of Indonesia based on Pancha Sila. After they are released and returned to the society, they still have to assure the Government through concrete deeds, that they consciously have discarded their

communist ideology, and that they are faithful to the Pancha Sila ideology, and as good Indonesian citizens they shall refrain from acts that are contrary to the Constitution and the Law. This adjustment is a social process in itself, which requires some time, and which also requires supervision by the society in general as well as by the law enforcement agencies.

To the society at large, I ask that everyone remains calm and unprovoked by issues created regarding the decision and program of the Government.

In fact, we should be alert and always maintain our unity for the sake of our national resilience, which is the main and decisive key in achieving our aspirations and ideals as stated in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution which we must carry out through the one and only alternative, namely national development.

APPENDIX III(a)

Translation of relevant extracts of

DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
INDONESIA No.11, 1963 ON ERADICATING
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA,

Bearing in Mind:

- a. that subversive activities are a danger to the safety and life of the people and the State which is in a state of revolution for the formation of a Socialist Indonesia;
- b. that, in order to safeguard efforts to achieve the objective of the revolution, it is necessary to have a regulation to eradicate the aforesaid subversive activities;
- c. that this regulation is within the framework of safeguarding the efforts to attain the objectives of the revolution so that it must be effected by means of a Presidential Decree;

DECIDES:

To enact: PRESIDENTIAL DECREE ON THE ERADICATION OF
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES.

CHAPTER I
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

Article 1

(1) The following shall be convicted of having engaged in subversive activities:

1. anyone who has engaged in an action with the purpose of or clearly with the purpose which is known to him or can be expected to be known to him can:
 - a. distort, undermine or deviate from the ideology of the Panca Sila state or the broad policy lines of the State, or
 - b. overthrow, destroy or undermine the power of the State or the authority of the lawful government or the machinery of the State, or

- c. disseminate feelings of hostility or arouse hostility, cause splits, conflicts, chaos, disturbances or anxiety among the population or broad sections of society or between the State of the Republic of Indonesia and a friendly state, or
 - d. disturb, retard or disrupt industry, production, distribution, commerce, cooperatives or transport conducted by the Government or based upon a decision of the Government or which exerts widespread influence on the livelihood of the people.
2. any person who undertakes a deed or activity which demonstrates sympathy with an enemy of the Republic of Indonesia or with a State that is not unfriendly towards the Republic of Indonesia;
 3. any person who damages or destroys installations which serve the public interest or large scale destruction of possessions, the property of individuals or organisations;
 4. any person who engages in espionage activities;
 5. any person who engages in sabotage.

(2) Anyone who encourages (*memikat*) such activities as referred to in paragraph (1) shall also be convicted of engaging in subversive activities.

Article 2

The following deeds to oppose the law shall be deemed to be espionage activities:

- a. to possess, control or acquire any map, plan, picture or article about military buildings or military secrets or statements related to government secrets in political, diplomatic or economic affairs for the purpose of passing the same, directly or indirectly to a foreign state or organisation or to counter-revolutionaries;
- b. to undertake investigations on behalf of an enemy or another State the things referred to in para (a), or to accept and receive in one's accommodation, to hide or help a person who spies on behalf of the enemy (*seorang menjelidiki musuh*);
- c. to carry out, facilitate or disseminate propaganda for an enemy or for another State that is unfriendly towards the Republic of Indonesia;
- d. to engage in an endeavour that conflicts with the interests of the State as a result of which a person can be investigated, guided, deprived of his freedom, or restricted, convicted or subjected to other measures by or on the authority of the enemy;

- e. to give to or receive from the enemy or another State that is unfriendly towards the Republic of Indonesia or to persons assisting such an enemy or State any thing or money, or to undertake any deed that is beneficial to such an enemy or State or persons assisting it, or to endanger, obstruct or foil any measure against such an enemy or State or persons assisting it.

Article 3

The following shall be deemed to be acts of sabotage, namely deeds by a person who, with intent or clearly with intent or who knows or can be deemed to know it, in order to destroy, obstruct, retard, damage or negate something of great importance to the endeavours of the Government regarding:

- a. commodities basic to the livelihood of the people, which are imported or produced by the Government;
- b. production, distribution or cooperatives which are under control of the Government;
- c. military, industrial, production and State commercial projects;
- d. general construction projects related to industry, production, distribution and communications;
- e. State installations;
- f. communications (land, sea, air and telecommunications).

CHAPTER II INVESTIGATION AND CONVICTION OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

Article 4

All departments of State are to assist in investigating subversive activities.

CHAPTER IV PUNISHMENT

Article 13

- (1) Any person who commits acts of subversion as specified in Article 1, paragraph 1, numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and paragraph 2 shall be sentenced to death, to life imprisonment or to a prison sentence of a maximum of 20 (twenty) years.
- (2) Any person who commits acts of subversion as specified in Article 1, paragraph 1, number 5 shall be sentenced to death, to life imprisonment or to a prison sentence of a maximum of 20 (twenty) years and/or a fine of at the most 30 (thirty) million rupiahs.

Article 14

All goods whether the property or not the property of the convicted person which have been acquired as a result of, or which have been used in the implementation of the acts of subversion can be confiscated.

APPENDIX III(b)

Defence Plea of Oei Tju Tat

3 March, 1976

IMPLEMENT TRISAKTI, THE CROWNING GLORY OF
REAL INDEPENDENCE

- Trisakti*
1. Sovereignty in political affairs.
 2. Self-reliance in economic affairs.
 3. Distinctive identity in cultural affairs.

1. Members of the Court,

First permit me, through this session, to express my appreciation and thanks to all groups and people who have at all times given me their attention, and sympathy and shown confidence in me, each in their own way. These people include pastors, priests and nuns, many of whom I do not personally know, also friends, acquaintances, comrades in struggle who are still behind barbed wire or who are out there in society, colleagues and lawyers at home and abroad, not forgetting Adnan Buyung Nasution, Amnesty International and other international organisations active in the defence of human rights, the International Commission of Jurists, Pax Christi, some members of the British House of Lords, and certain officials who, directly or indirectly helped to arrange this trial, including some state officials, some of whom occupy senior and the highest posts.

I should also like to express my appreciation of the wisdom of the Court of Judges in guiding these hearings.

Finally my boundless thanks to the team of lawyers, Mr Yap Thiam Hien, Mr Djamaluddin Datuk Singo Mangkuto and Mr Albert Hasibuan, who have given so much time and expertise, being inspired by the desire to serve truth and justice, and to help the struggle to uphold the rule of law in this Panca Sila State. My deepest gratitude to them for doing all this *con amore*.

2. As regards this so-called case of mine, is it really true that I infringed the law? Or are there political reasons that, whatever the outcome of the case, I must be set aside from society, if necessary by means of a new version of the Dreyfus Affair, a kind of van de Lubbe case or Multatuli's "he-must-hang" case?

It is a fact that although I was arrested in March 1966 it was not until three years later, in about the middle of 1969, that I was interrogated. Then there were three more years of nothing; I was never asked anything. Then in 1972, I was interrogated again, not as a continuation of the 1969 interrogations but just a repeat interrogation about the same things. Goodness only knows how many times altogether interrogations were carried out; so much so, that one officer, CPM Colonel Noordali let slip, that many of the charges against me were nothing more than slanders. It became difficult to conceal the fact that my 'case' was being treated like a pingpong ball between the competent authorities. So, it is easy to understand that, even though it was announced in April 1974, my so-called case would "very soon" be brought to trial, it was subsequently repeatedly announced that it was being postponed for various reasons. Once it was reported that a committee had been set up to study this case, and . . . heaven knows with what result. But later, new people were appointed to handle the 'case' and it was even said that the initial documents of the *Teperpu* Team (Central Interrogation Team) had been lost. . .!

And then, a high-level State official actually discussed it with the most senior State official and two of his colleagues. All said indeed that there was certainly no case to answer.

All this, together with the fact that I am present in this court today provided an answer to the above mentioned question. There has clearly been a process of pull and push. Those who can see no reason preferring charges against me, have lost, while those wanting a political trial rather than a legal trial have won, for the time being, as is obvious from the Prosecution's *Requisitoire* *.

3. I still strongly deny all the charges made against me. The legal aspects will be dealt with by my defence lawyers. By even a superficial study of my demeanor, origin, background, life-style, environment and family, people would not easily conclude that I would be likely to engage in subversive activities. What is more, if my political opinions and interests are taken into account, this would make such a charge even less likely. Just imagine "subverting the legal government at that time". Is it not a fact, according to the 1945 Constitution which is official and lawful to this very day, that the legitimate government at that time was non other than the Government of President Sukarno. So what does this make me?

* *Requisitoire*: In Indonesian legal practices it is the demand made by the public prosecutor for the punishment of the accused in the charges stated.

In the book *From Private to President* by a German journalist G. Roder which is a biography of General Suharto, it says that President Suharto mentioned me as a comrade in Sukarno's struggle. Who then would not be astonished and at the same time amused to hear that I, reputedly as a fellow traveller of Sukarno am accused of subversion against the Sukarno Government of which I myself was a member! Is the purpose here to discredit Sukarno of whom I was a follower? This too, is quite absurd.

4. These court hearings are open to the public, in accordance with the basic principles of justice. It is therefore certain that the things said in this courtroom will be heard not only in various parts of the country but also beyond the borders of Indonesia. In short, the whole world will be in a position to judge the extent to which truth, justice and adherence to the law are valid in this Panca Sila State.

So, it is correct and proper for all those playing a part in this trial to endeavour to ensure that it is a fair trial for the sake of the good name of the State and Government of Indonesia because it will be impossible to conceal any of this from the eyes and ears of people abroad.

How disappointed and amazed I was to hear the Prosecutor's *requisitoire* delivered on 25 February 1976. I think the Court will agree that a *requisitoire* should be a resumé of the results of the Court hearings and not the fantasies which the Prosecuting Counsel had in his mind before this trial started. I am therefore quite amazed that this *requisitoire* completely ignores matters that came to light during the hearings, and in places even made points that completely contradict what had been said in court. I shall give just a few examples, as there are too many to mention them all:

- (a) I never said that the 4 October 1965 Partindo C. Board statement was the result of the meeting that was held at my home, Jalan Blitar, 10;
- (b) It is not true that witness Armunanto said that the statement was the unanimous decision reached by the Partindo C.B. at its meeting on 3 October 1965.
- (c) It is not true that witness H. Winoto Danuasmoro said that I was among the persons who had made the 4 October statement, etc, etc.

It is really difficult to understand why the Prosecution failed to hear things said in these hearings, for instance:

- (i) the categorical statements by witnesses Armunanto, Adisumarto and Sutomo that I did not participate in the dis-

cussion although they were held at Jalan Blitar 10, that no decision was taken at my home because we still had to await the results of the discussion between the three Partindo Ministers and President Sukarno in Bogor.

- (ii) the statements made by all these witnesses plus witnesses Winoto Danuasmoro and Sardjono that it was initially I who made objections to the said 4 October Partindo statement, etc, etc.

5. Members of the Court, it would be tedious to repeat everything that has been said by various witnesses during these hearings. Happily we live in this electronic age, so that tapes taken of all the proceedings make it impossible for us to imagine things or hear only what we want to hear. My summary of the hearings, which can if necessary be checked against the tapes, is:

a) *Re the 4 October Partindo Statement*

All witnesses confirmed that I did not participate in the discussions held in my home on 3 October 1965; that the 4 October statement was drafted by other persons or persons in another place without awaiting the results of the meeting of the three Partindo ministers and President Sukarno in Bogor; that I rejected the statement because the coup conspirators had dismissed the Dwikora Cabinet which for me meant that it was a coup d'état attempt and that therefore it was not a matter of concern only to the Army but had a nationwide scope. Moreover, I had already committed myself in my letter to the President/Supreme Commander/Great Leader of the Revolution, Sukarno and Deputy Prime Minister Dr J. Leimena on 2 October 1965, and that therefore I was the first person to protest at the 4 October statement.

One further comment about all this: it is ridiculous indeed that I as a member of the Fact Finding Commission never before heard in the regions anything about the dissemination of that statement or the consequences of that statement. What the Commission did know was that victims of the murders, robberies and other things were members of the Nadhlatul Ulama, the PKI and the Partai Nasional Indonesia, and the majority were non-party people, so that the construction made in the *requisitoire* about the effects of that statement are really too far-fetched.

b) *Re my remarks at the Baperki Xth Anniversary and the East Java Provincial Partindo Committee Meeting*

Presumably the Court will be able to draw its own conclusions from the testimony of several witnesses which certainly did not

make any sense; for instance the call for the formation of a Disaster Victims Aid Committee, about the nominations for East Java Governor etc. My statements were all basically the same, and it was all just a matter of routine. Further, it should be noted that the demonstrations were organised or sponsored by the various Fronts that existed: The Youth Front, the National Front, etcetera. Thus it was quite impossible for Partindo, let alone me, to play about with instructions.

c) *Re the so-called information from Junta Suardi*

The witness himself expressed doubts about the truth of this information which meant that he himself did not come to my office but thought it enough to send a copy of it via his assistant on 25 September 1965. But the important thing is that I had just returned home from abroad on 23 September. Quite candidly, if indeed I had been able to receive that letter the next day, the first thing I would certainly have done would have been to have called Junta Suardi and checked its reliability before reporting to the President. The fact is that the first time I heard about this question was at my interrogation in 1969 at Nirabaya Camp, by Lieutenant-Colonel Tatang.

d) *Re my briefing at the Partindo C. Board Meeting*

As regards the things mentioned by witnesses Ismail Ishak and Moh Noor Nasution about an "executive meeting of the Partindo C. Board" on a Friday in August 1965 which, so they say, was attended by Asmara Hadi, Winoto Danuasmoro, Armunanto, K. Werdoyo Sardjono and others, and on which occasion I was said to have given a briefing about President Sukarno's illness and so on, this has been proven false by the testimony of the witnesses themselves as well as by sheer common sense. Such a meeting could not logically have taken place after 17 August 1965, when President Sukarno appeared in public in excellent health and delivered his independence day speech; whereas on the Fridays just before 17 August 1965, those persons named as having attended the meeting, including me, were not in Jakarta.

e) *Re demonstrations*

Witness Achmad Johar, deputy of the demonstration against USIS Jakarta stated that the demonstration was reported to the Minister/Secretary General of the National Front who, after consulting with the four commanders of the Armed Forces, reached the decision that a number of USIS books would be "detained" at Salemba Prison. Nothing was destroyed, and the demonstration was controlled jointly by the Youth Front and the police. I do not

know about any delegates coming to my office. I personally have no objection to demonstrations because in those days there was no ban on demonstrations. Demonstrations were permitted by the government, which subsequently halted all USIS activities in Indonesia.

Some of those who now feel that their feet were trodden on during demonstrations in those days—in Jakarta, as well as in Surabaya and elsewhere and who now wish to attribute all the responsibility to me would do well to read *The Impossible Dream* by Howard Jones, former US Ambassador in Jakarta, who carefully recorded everything. He of all people represented those directly concerned and he makes no wild allegations as some people do these days. This shows the groundlessness of all these false charges about my inciting people in Surabaya.

6. Members of the Court, certain points need to be made:

a) The Prosecuting Counsel considers that I committed subversion. Common sense would suggest that the person competent to judge whether or not I committed subversion was the late President Sukarno or at the very least the Cabinet Presidium to which I had been seconded; or, members of that former Cabinet. It is therefore most regrettable that Dr Subandrio, Dr J. Leimena, Foreign Minister Adam Malik and Rev. J.W. Rumambi were not permitted to testify in these hearings.

One thing is clear—that President Sukarno in several Cabinet reshuffles before and after the attempted coup retained me in his Cabinet. And even after a slander campaign had started against me, President Sukarno, in the Cabinet Session on 6 November 1965, defended me.

It has been reported that according to investigations by a US Senate Committee, the late President Sukarno was a target of CIA activity, so one should look in that direction if one is looking for acts of subversion during the Sukarno Government's period of office. It is tragic that only now, after President Sukarno has been dead for 6 years and when I no longer sit in the government but have spent the past ten years behind barbed wire, other people or groups now want to pass judgement on me.

b) This also applies to the opinion that I attach more importance to party interests than to my position as Minister of State. If this were true, I would certainly not be standing here before this court. But that view has proved false, and in previous sessions dissatisfied voices were heard, complaining that I did not have the powers to place people from my own party in jobs in my secretariat; I was called

arrogant, a know-all and not prepared to listen to the party, etc. It is significant that among the witnesses brought to these hearings by the Prosecution there has not been a single person from the Armed Forces, the government or persons of civil rank, but they were all from Partindo. This strongly suggests that this 'case' has exploited the personal sentiments and weaknesses of some Partindo members, and that therefore it is not altogether businesslike.

c) I should like to express my appreciation to the Prosecutor for still acknowledging in his *requisitoire* that I am a nationalist, within the NAS grouping (of NASAKOM). Indeed, if I were a communist, why beat about the bush and not admit it? We should not close our eyes to the facts of history that communist ideology and power are becoming more significant in world politics. Nor can we ignore the fact that the Indonesian communist movement contributed to the nation's struggle for independence from Dutch colonialism, from Japanese fascism, as well as opposing imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism in the years following 1945.

But I hereby declare that I, in my entire existence, have never been able to accept the ideology and political doctrine of communism in particular its materialist philosophy and certain communist practices. Neither have I ever been a communist sympathiser nor been used by them. Were what the Prosecution says true—that I once cooperated with the PKI or with PKI people, so long as the PKI or these other people did not jeopardise the political interests of President Sukarno or Partindo, why should I refuse to collaborate with them in the same way as I collaborated in the past with other political groups? Nor should it be forgotten that there were (or at the least there were attempts) towards cooperation between nine political parties that were legal at that time, right up to the outbreak of the contemptible G.30.s movement.

The well-known statesman, Averill Harriman who was once US Assistant Secretary of State for Eastern Affairs said in a TV interview when asked about Sukarno: "He is not a communist. He is a nationalist." Let us hope that people in Indonesia can distinguish between progressive nationalists, socialist nationalists (read *Achieving Independent Indonesia* by Sukarno) and communists.

d) As regards condemning the coup conspirators, (see page 23 of the Prosecuting Counsel's *requisitoire*), I hope the Prosecution contacts the Department of Trade and that it will still find there a tape of a meeting between the Minister of Trade, Brigadier-General A. Jusuf and some leading businessmen from the capital, held in the days following the coup affair. At the request of Minister Jusuf, I was

present at that meeting. It was there that for the very first time, a state official categorically described the attempted coup as a "deplorable national tragedy". And that person was the one who is now standing before you all.

(The juridical aspects of the defence to be handled by the Defence Team. The remainder is a summary of Oei's political views.)

APPENDIX IV

PRISONERS ON BURU: SOME CASE HISTORIES

When the Indonesian Government began to transport prisoners to Buru in 1969, they promised that the men sent there would be fit adults, chosen after medical examination. But it became clear later that the selection of prisoners was done without much regard for the Government's declared basis of selection. One cause for serious concern is the fact that about 600 of the detainees now imprisoned on Buru were youths under 21 when they were transported to the island.

Most of the prisoners in the penal camps on Buru are ordinary Indonesians—labourers, office workers, town workers in various occupations. Little is known about these people individually. Also on Buru are a number of distinguished Indonesian intellectuals, who were associated with left-wing organizations, some of which were affiliated to the Indonesian Communist Party when that party was legally playing an active part in Indonesian politics before 1965. (Intellectuals—Pramoedya Aranta Tur and Karel Supit.)

The following is a representative selection of prisoners on Buru.

Soehadi

Soehadi is a farmer, of about 34, from Central Java. The precise circumstances of his arrest are not known, but he has been in detention since 1965. He has not heard from his family since he was arrested. His mother now lives with his sister. His father died many years ago.

Rivai Apin

Rivai Apin, a well-known writer and poet, was born in 1927 in Minangkabau, Central Sumatra. He was a founder member in 1946 of *Gelanggang*, a cultural organization whose aim it was to encourage Indonesian writing based on the principles of humanism and internationalism. Before Indonesia's independence in 1945 most intellectuals used Dutch as their first language; consequently little was written in Indonesian. It was only during the independence struggle against the Dutch that a group of Indonesian nationalist writers appeared.

Apin became active in LEKRA, the left-wing cultural association, during the mid-1950s, and in 1956, he became editor of *Zaman Baru*, a PKI supported journal. In 1959, he was elected to the Executive Committee of LEKRA.

Precise details about the circumstances of Apin's arrest are not known, but he was most probably detained at the end of 1965.

Soedono

Soedono, a painter and decorator, was arrested in 1968 and detained in Jakarta before being transported to Buru some time between 1969 and 1971. He was a member of LEKRA. Soedono was born in 1933 in Java; his wife and five children still live in Jakarta.

Asmudji

Asmudji, aged about 43, is a former teacher. He was active in left-wing political affairs from his early youth and belonged to the youth organization *Pesindo*, which subsequently became *Pemuda Rakyat*. He was also a member of the *Pemuda Rakyat* Central Board. Asmudji was arrested in 1965, and first detained in Salemba Prison in Jakarta. In 1969, he was transported to Buru Island. His wife Suning was arrested with him, and has been detained since then in Bukit Duri Prison, Jakarta.

Purwadi

Purwadi, aged 33, graduated from the Economic Secondary School, and was a member of *Pemuda Rakyat*, the youth organization banned in 1966. At the time of his arrest in December 1965, he was working in the Madukismo Sugar Factory. Purwadi is one of about 200 detainees on Buru whose families have come to join them in prison, despite the unsatisfactory conditions.

Tjoo Tik Tjoon

Tjoo Tik Tjoon, aged 55, was a member of parliament representing the Indonesian Communist Party from 1956 to 1963. He also belonged to BAPERKI, The Consultative Body of Indonesian Citizenship, founded in 1954 in order to secure full civil and human rights for all Indonesian citizens, particularly racial minorities and especially the Chinese. Mr Tjoo was arrested on 24 December 1965, and first detained in army barracks in Jakarta. He was subsequently moved to a prison outside Jakarta, and in 1961 transported to Buru. His wife and some of his children are still in Jakarta.

Sumardjo

Sumardjo is one of several hundred boys who were arrested when teenagers and who now face indefinite detention on Buru. At the time of his arrest, Sumardjo was in the second year of senior high school and a member of *Ikatan Pemuda Paladjar Indonesia*, the League of High School Students, a left-wing students' organization. Precise details about Sumardjo's arrest are not known, but he was probably in his mid-teens at that time, and is now only about 25.

Basuki Effendi

Basuki Effendi is one of Indonesia's foremost film directors, a number of whose films have received international awards. He is about 43, is married and has two children. He was a member of the film section of LEKRA, and in 1959, was elected on to its Central Executive. He was first arrested in October 1965 and detained for four months in Jakarta. After his release in February 1966, he was unable to return to his former work. He was re-arrested in 1969 and transported to Buru in 1971.

Ferdinand Runturambi

Ferdinand Runturambi is a former member of parliament and active trade unionist. He was born in Sumatra in November 1918, and is a practising Roman Catholic. He became involved in the labour movement while working as an official in the Ministry of Public Works and Energy in 1950, and in 1953 was elected on to the Central Bureau of SOBSI, the trade union federation. Two years later, in 1955, he was elected on to its National Council, and finally, in 1964, he became third Deputy Chairman of SOBSI. Runturambi was also active in the international labour movement and attended the Moscow International Economic Conference in 1952 and the World Federation of Trade Unions meetings in Bandung and Colombo in 1954, where he became an alternate member of the General Council.

Runturambi was an active supporter of the Indonesian independence movement. In 1945, he was arrested by the Japanese because of his work in the nationalist movement and detained for a short period.

Iskander Sukarno

Iskander Sukarno, aged about 48, was a member of the Indonesian Communist Party. He was employed by the Department of Education as an inspector of secondary schools in Jakarta until 1965. He

was first arrested in 1965, but released early in 1966. He was re-arrested in October 1968, detained at first in Salemba Prison, Jakarta, and later moved to a prison camp in Nusakambangan. In 1976, he was one of the first detainees to be transported to Buru since 1971, when transportation stopped after the first 10,000 prisoners were established there. Although his wife was able to visit him in Nusakambangan in south-central Java, communication with him is now almost impossible.

Tom Anwar

Tom Anwar was Deputy Chief Editor of the newspaper *Bintang Timur* and a member of the Indonesian Journalists' Association. He was arrested in late 1965 and was one of the first prisoners to be transported to Buru in 1969. He is aged about 50, married and has several children.

Tjiptoharsojo

Tjiptoharsojo was a teacher in Bondowoso, East Java and a member of a radical teachers' association. After the attempted coup in October 1965, he and his wife, also a teacher, fled from Bondowoso to Surabaya and then to Jakarta, where Tjiptoharsojo was finally arrested in 1968. His wife, afraid to leave her husband alone, accompanied him to the office of the unit that arrested him, where she too was arrested and detained for five years. After her release in 1974, she was forced to find accommodation in Army barracks in Jakarta, as she had nowhere to live. Tjiptoharsojo was transported to Buru some time after 1969. In the four years since then his wife has received only two letters from him.

Richard Paingot Situmeang

Richard Paingot Situmeang was born in Tarutung, Sumatra in 1919. He is a Christian, a former member of parliament, elected in 1955, and a leading trade unionist. In 1937, he began working in the oil fields in Sumatra, where he helped organize the nationalist movement among his fellow workers during the Japanese occupation and where he helped form a union of young oil workers. He also belonged to the Indonesian Socialist Youth organization, *Pesindo*. In 1951, he was elected on to the Central Executive Committee of SOBSI, the trade union federation, and in 1960 on to its national presidium. Because of his leading position in SOBSI, he travelled extensively outside Indonesia attending conferences in a number

of places, including Peking and Vienna. He was arrested in late 1965 with his wife, who was released in the early 1970s. They have eight children.

* * *

The well-known Indian poet and journalist Dom Moraes visited Buru in 1972 and reported on the plight of the prisoners in the *Asia Magazine* and in the *London Daily Telegraph* (24 March 1972):

“It was stupid, in 1965, to decide that a mass of small, helpless people, clerks and bank tellers and office workers, were all hardline communists: stupid to decide that several of the leading intellectuals of the country were hardline communists without any trial or investigation whatever. It is stupid to have kept them locked up for six years, unable to communicate with their families, and eventually committed them to Buru, 2,000 miles from their homes. It is stupid to try and turn intellectuals into manual labourers.”

APPENDIX V

EXTRACTS FROM MEMORANDUM TO PRESIDENT SUHARTO AND THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA SUBMITTED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (February 1971)

While fully appreciating the extremely difficult and dangerous situation which faced the Indonesian Government in 1965 and 1966, it is considered that the continued detention of vast numbers of persons who are uncharged and untried clearly contravenes the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the norms of the Rule of Law. The continuance of this situation is obviously highly damaging to the image of Indonesia in the outside world; it also tends to prolong the memory and bitterness resulting from the tragic events of 1965. From discussions we have had with both the responsible civil and military authorities in Jakarta, we believe that the Indonesian Government appreciates the necessity of dealing with this problem.

“One of the difficulties we have found in the course of our investigations is the absence of reliable public statistics as to the number of prisoners held. . .

“. . . It is strongly recommended that the Government should take steps to obtain and publish precise figures as to the numbers held. Unless this is done the Government itself and the international agencies which are prepared to help the Government will be faced with added difficulties in the formulation of release programs.

“In regard to the Category A prisoners the problem as we see it is that even if charges and evidence are available to put them on trial, the existing judicial machinery is totally inadequate to undertake the trial of 5,000 persons. It is understood that it is the intention of the Government to appoint five hundred new judges by 1974 for the purpose of undertaking these trials. Even if the Government does find it possible to appoint five hundred new judges and the necessary ancillary legal personnel within the

course of the next two or three years, the trial of some 5,000 persons is bound to take another 10 years or so. This would mean that many of those awaiting trial will probably die before they are tried and that in a number of cases trials will take place only some 10 to 15 years after the events that form the basis of charges. This is obviously most unsatisfactory. It is therefore suggested that a re-assessment of the cases of the 5,000 prisoners in Category A should be undertaken with a view to the release of those against whom there is no evidence and of those who even if guilty of some offence, could be regarded as having purged their offence by the 5 years they have already spent in prison. It is believed that if such a review of the Category A prisoners were undertaken, the number remaining for trial would be considerably reduced. The program for the strengthening of the judicial machinery and the appointment of additional judges should in any case be proceeded with as the existing judicial machinery is insufficient by any standards. The existing judges, while dedicated, are overwhelmed with work.

“In regard to the Category B prisoners it is suggested that in these cases too there should be a complete revaluation. It is completely contrary to the norms of the Rule of Law that persons suspected of being ‘communist’ should be detained indefinitely without charge or trial. If any of them are alleged to have committed crimes, they should be tried. . .

“The principal reason advanced by members of the Government for the slowness in the release of the Category C prisoners is the fear of physical reprisals by the local populations. There has been no evidence of such an attitude by the population in the very substantial releases which have taken place in the last year. It is confidently hoped that the President and members of the Government could offset any such danger by appealing to the population to facilitate the reintegration of the released prisoners into the life of the Indonesian nation.

“Without questioning the well-meaning motives which may have inspired the massive transportation of untried prisoners to island detention camps, it is a policy which is fraught with grave danger and which cannot be justified under any legal concept. The transportation for life of 10,000 prisoners, mostly males, without their families to camps on remote islands is clearly contrary to the laws of humanity and to justice. What is to happen to these vast penal settlements in the future? Is this the best way of eradicating the bitterness and dissension of the past? Is it wise to create

substantial pockets of population, which will not unnaturally nourish resentment against the authorities who have transported them there? If any program of resettlement for ex-prisoners is envisaged, this should be done on the basis of reintegration of the ex-prisoners into the life of the community and wherever possible, on the basis of family grouping. . .

“In relation to the treatment of all prisoners we would respectfully draw the attention of the Indonesian Government to the provisions of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. We appreciate that in the existing circumstances it will take some time before they can be fully put into operation in Indonesia. We would, however, urge that copies of these Rules should be supplied to the commandants of all military camps of detention where prisoners are detained.

“The concern of Amnesty International in making the propositions herein set forth was to put forward proposals which might be of assistance to the Indonesian Government in the solution of a problem which is of paramount importance for the future development and stability of the Republic of Indonesia. Amnesty International and indeed the other international organisations working in the human rights field would, we feel, be more than willing to extend any assistance in their power to the Indonesian Government to secure the constructive solution of these problems”.

APPENDIX VI

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS ON BEHALF OF INDONESIAN POLITICAL PRISONERS

From its founding in 1961, Amnesty International has taken up cases of Indonesian political prisoners detained without trial by the former administration of the late President Sukarno. Thus, for example, the distinguished Indonesian journalist Mochtar Lubis, who was imprisoned without trial for more than nine years in all by President Sukarno, was adopted by Amnesty International as a prisoner of conscience. When in 1975, Mr Lubis was imprisoned by President Suharto's Government, Amnesty International again adopted.

Since 1965, the focus of Amnesty International's work for Indonesian political prisoners has been an adoption program which over the years has led to the taking up of the cases of hundreds of prisoners who were known not to have been personally involved in the abortive coup of 1965. Amnesty International adoption groups in many countries have written to the Indonesian Government urging the release of the prisoners.

In addition, the organization provided information about Indonesian political prisoners. In February 1973, Amnesty International made a submission to the Secretary General of the United Nations asking the UN Commission on Human Rights to "intercede with the Government of Indonesia to ensure the immediate trial or release of all untried prisoners". Evidence was presented to show that the government's policy "revealed a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms".

In March 1973, a documented and illustrated report, *Indonesia Special*, was published jointly by the International Secretariat and the Dutch Section of Amnesty International. In it Sean MacBride, then Chairman of Amnesty International, appealed to President Suharto and the Indonesian Government to announce a general amnesty for all untried prisoners (see Appendix 5).

For several years, the organization's International Secretariat has sent information about Indonesian political prisoners to governments of all countries who belong to the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (the international consortium of governments giving aid

to Indonesia) drawing their attention to the situation of political prisoners.

The Indonesian Government's attitude to Amnesty International has been ambivalent. The first Amnesty International mission to Indonesia was by Professor Julius Stone, a distinguished international lawyer from Australia, in July 1969. This was followed by a second mission, by Sean MacBride, then Secretary General of the International Commission of Jurists and later, in October 1970, Chairman of Amnesty International. In July 1972, a mission by Professor Telford Taylor of Columbia University, New York, and Professor James Harrison, then Chairman of Amnesty International, United States Section, had to be cancelled when the latter's visa application was refused. In January 1975, an Amnesty International delegation from Australia, led by Mr Richard McGarvie, Chairman of the Victoria Bar Council and now a Supreme Court Judge, went to Jakarta, but Indonesian ministers and officials who were directly concerned with political imprisonment refused, or said they were unable to meet the delegation to discuss the problem of imprisonment.

For many years, Amnesty International has criticized government policies which have adversely affected political prisoners. The particularly desperate circumstances of women prisoners was publicized in an international campaign in April 1975, focussed on Kartini Day, which is celebrated in Indonesia as Women's Day to commemorate the famous national heroine. During International Women's Year, Indonesia stood out as the country with probably the largest number of women political prisoners.

Amnesty International sections undertook campaigns on Indonesian Independence Day, 17 August 1975. The organization's Swedish Section collected the signatures of 130 parliamentarians on a petition for the release of untried political prisoners. In the Federal Republic of Germany, about 31,000 signatures were collected. In Austria, also several thousand signatures were collected, and in all three countries, the petitions were delivered to the Indonesian Embassy.

In October 1975, a coordinated international campaign took up the cases of the tens of thousands of prisoners who had by then spent up to 10 years in detention without trial. Publicity was organized at local, national and international levels. Many Amnesty International adoption groups publicized the situation in their own local communities, by means of information stalls, discussion groups and articles in the local press. In the United States, Australia, the Netherlands, Austria, Canada and other countries, there was exten-

sive coverage by press, radio and television.

In April 1976, there was another Amnesty International campaign on behalf of women prisoners. Many national sections, Nigerian, Japanese, Belgian and Swiss sent appeals and petitions to the Indonesian Government for the release of the women prisoners.

In autumn 1976, a major Amnesty International campaign publicized the organization's criticism of the Indonesian Government's Buru "transmigration" program. There was wide news coverage in many countries, including the United States, Canada, France, the Netherlands and Australia.

This publication coincides with the beginning of a major international campaign to inform people all over the world about the plight of the tens of thousands of political prisoners in Indonesia. Information about this campaign is available from the appropriate national sections of Amnesty International, or from the International Secretariat in London.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATIONS

Report on Allegations of Torture in Brazil, A5, 108 pages, first edition September 1972, re-set with updated preface March 1976: £1.20 (US \$3.00).

A Chronicle of Current Events (Journal of the Human Rights Movement in the USSR), numbers 17, 18, 21, 24, 27 published individually: 65 pence (US \$1.60); double volumes 19-20, 22-23, 25-26: 85 pence (US \$2.10); numbers 28-31 in one volume: 95 pence (US \$2.50); numbers 32-33, one volume, £1.95 (US \$4.95).

Chile: an Amnesty International Report, A5, 80 pages in English, 88 pages Spanish, September 1974: 85 pence (US \$2.10).

Report on an Amnesty International Mission to Spain, A5, 24 pages in English, 28 pages Spanish, September 1975: 35 pence (US \$0.90).

Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR: Their Treatment and Conditions, A5, 154 pages, November 1975: £1.00 (US \$2.50).

AI in Quotes, A5, 24 pages, May 1976: 25 pence (US \$0.50).

Amnesty International 1961-1976: A chronology, May 1976: 20 pence (US \$0.40).

Professional Codes of Ethics, A5, 32 pages, October 1976: 40 pence (US \$1.00). Also available in Spanish.

Report of an Amnesty International Mission to Sri Lanka, A4, 52 pages, second edition December 1976: 75 pence (US \$1.25).

Los Abogados Contra La Tortura, A4, 31 pages, first published in Spanish, January 1977: 60 pesetas, 50 pence (US \$1.00).

Report of an Amnesty International Mission to the Republic of the Philippines, A5, 60 pages, first published September 1976, second (updated) edition March 1977: £1.00. Also available in Spanish.

Dossier on political prisoners held in secret detention camps in Chile, A4, March 1977: £1.45. Also available in Spanish.

Report of an Amnesty International Mission to Argentina, A4, 92 pages, March 1977: £1.00. Also available in Spanish.

Torture in Greece: The First Torturers' Trial 1975, A5, 98 pages, April 1977: 85 pence.

Islamic Republic of Pakistan. An Amnesty International Report including the findings of a Mission, A4, 96 pages, May 1977: 75 pence.

Evidence of Torture: Studies by the Amnesty International Danish Medical Group, A5, 40 pages, June 1977: 50 pence.

Report of an Amnesty International Mission to The Republic of Korea, A4, 46 pages, first published April 1976 second edition June 1977: 75 pence.

The Republic of Nicaragua. An Amnesty International Report including the findings of a Mission to Nicaragua 10–15 May 1976, A4, 75 pages, July 1977: 75 pence.

In addition to these major reports, Amnesty International also publishes a monthly Newsletter, an Annual Report and a regular series of Amnesty International Briefing Papers:

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Amnesty International Publications are available in English and in most cases have been translated into other major world languages by the International Secretariat or by the national sections of Amnesty International.

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